COMMENTS OF COUNCIL ON INTELLIGENT ENERGY & CONSERVATION POLICY
and PROMOTING HEALTH AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY (PHASE)
Michel Lee, Esq.
Chairman, Council on Intelligent Energy & Conservation Policy (CIECP)
May 7, 2020
Re: STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CASE 19-E-0730 - Joint Petition of Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC; Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC; and Nuclear Asset Management Company, LLC for a Declaratory Ruling Disclaiming Jurisdiction Over or Abstaining from Review of the Proposed Transfers or, in the Alternative, an Order Approving the Proposed Transfers Pursuant to Section 70 of the New York Public Service Law.
Dear Public Service Commission:
The Council on Intelligent Energy & Conservation Policy (CIECP) and Promoting Health and Sustainable Energy (PHASE) strongly urge the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) to:
(1) Retain your rightful jurisdiction over the Indian Point nuclear facility, and
(2) Take a hard look, pursuant to New York Public Service Law Section 70 (PSL §70), at whether the transactions contemplated in this matter and the site license transfers are in the public interest.
On November 22, 2019, a Joint Petition for a Declaratory Ruling Disclaiming Jurisdiction Over or Abstaining from Review of the Proposed Transfers or, in the Alternative, an Order Approving the Proposed Transfers Pursuant to Section 70 of the New York Public Service Law (Petition) was filed by Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC; Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC; and the Holtec International subsidiary known as Nuclear Asset Management Company, LLC (Petitioners). The Petition involves a series of proposed transfers, which include transfer of ownership of the Indian Point site, facilities, components, spent nuclear fuel, and trust funds. The Petition asks the PSC to issue a declaratory ruling determining, inter alia, that it does not have jurisdiction over, or will abstain from, review of the proposed transfers.
Entergy and Holtec have also filed a joint application seeking Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval of transfer of licenses of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit nos 1, 2 and 3 and the Indian Point Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) to Holtec International and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI). 1 The application envisions a labyrinthine series of transfers of operation and responsibility over the Indian Point site to a variety of Holtec fully-owned and partially-owned subsidiaries, including a joint venture entity. For ease of reference, these Comments use the terms Entergy and Holtec or petitioners to refer generally to said parties.
1 Specifically, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENOI), on behalf of itself; Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC; Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (collectively, Entergy) has sought to transfer control of the operating licenses for and authority over Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (Indian Point or IP1, IP2, and IP3) and the general license for the Indian Point Energy Center Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) (collectively, the licenses) to Holtec International; and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) (Holtec). As per an order of the NRC, a Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) submitted by Holtec, including a Site-Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimate (DCE), is deemed part of the Application. ML20026A002.
INTRODUCTION:
Indian Point reactor unit 1 was shut down in October 1974. Unit 2 ceased operation on April 30, 2020. Unit 3 is expected to cease operation by April 30, 2021. Decommissioning is planned to begin thereafter.
So as not to strain the current limited time resources of PSC staff, we will here not focus here on the many well articulated facts stated and concerns raised by the Westchester County Board of Legislators in the instant case as well as by the New York Attorney General with respect to the specific deficiencies in the joint Entergy-Holtec license transfer application. We agree with our State’s Attorney General and aver that arguments made in the Petition of the State of New York for Leave to Intervene and for a Hearing are abundantly supported by the evidence presented and detailed therein. 2 As the PSC is well aware, New York State, Westchester County and the Town of Cortlandt, Village of Buchanan, and Hendrick Hudson School District, as well as Riverkeeper, Inc. and Hudson River Sloop Clearwater have all raised serious and substantial concerns regarding the financial wherewithal and technical capability of Holtec. 3
Rather, in these Comments, we seek to contribute a new perspective to the record with a specific focus on recent reports relating to the pipeline and the novel and evolving conditions presented by the Covid-19 pandemic.
We submit that the current crisis illustrates why low-probability, high consequence events such as the rupture of gas pipelines, pandemics/epidemics, terrorism, extreme weather, and natural disasters must be taken into consideration in cost and technical capability calculations, especially where the “high consequence” may be truly catastrophic.
Substantially elevated risks, by definition, will impact time and cost assumptions and challenge the technical capability of even substantially capitalized entities.
Any serious event occurring at the site during decommissioning or the failure to adequately manage the nuclear waste (spent fuel) will have major impacts for the simple reason that Indian Point is situated in the most highly populated area of any nuclear power plant in the nation.
The Covid-19 crisis illustrates the need to incorporate uncertainty and unpredictability into calculations. Further the Covid-19 crisis demonstrates that analyses involving hazardous activities and sites must be broad in scope and forward-thinking. In our connected and warming world, we need to approach risks posed by pathogens, terrorism (including cyberattacks), and acts of Mother Nature by taking into consideration the harsh reality that these hazards may not be fully escapable. Entergy and Holtec fail to take any of these realities into serious account, but the PSC must.
2 CIECP and PHASE support and incorporate by reference the arguments and evidence presented in the comments in this matter submitted by the Westchester County Board of Legislators; Riverkeeper Inc., and Hudson River Sloop Clearwater. CIECP and PHASE further support and incorporate by reference the arguments and evidence presented in Intervenor Petition filed by the State of New York with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, including the declarations petition to intervene. ML20043F273. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/001_state_petition_
to_intervene.pdf.
3 Key concerns raised include: (a) Holtec is a private company which has, continues, and plans to set up a series of shell companies to own and manage decommissioning and the high-level nuclear waste in the ISFSI. None of these companies have ever fully decommissioned a single nuclear plant site. None appear to have substantial capital. (b) Holtec has failed to elucidate a plan to remediate the substantial quantity of contaminants and radioactive water which have – over decades - leaked and leached deep into the soil and groundwater beneath the site and which are leaking into the Hudson River. The presence of structures, including old water mains under the site, and the leaks from the spent fuel pools are likely to be exacerbated by the use of heavy equipment during dismantlement of structure and construction of an additional ISFSI pad. (c) The Entergy-Holtec application failed to include a single mention of the “Algonquin” Pipeline system that runs under Indian Point Energy Center. New York State conducted a risk assessment of the co-location of these pipelines with Indian Point and identified decommissioning activities as posing an increased risk of rupture and fire.
POINT ONE: None of the Documents or NRC Regulations Upon Which Entergy and Holtec Rely Take into Account the Potential Impacts on Site Decommissioning and ISFSI Costs Related to the Unique Hazard Conditions at Indian Point – These Impact All Levels of Technical and Financial Risk
Even before Covid-19 struck, Entergy and Holtec disregarded the potential disruption of decommissioning activity which could result as a consequence of unanalyzed (or grossly improperly and inadequately analyzed) conditions and infrastructure highly specific to the Indian Point site.
Holtec’s cost estimates are based on outdated assumptions and give no serious consideration to the possibility of a major accident involving high velocity shaking, vibration, fires, and/or collapses of various non-robust structures (e.g., roofs and debris falling into the spent fuel pool). The potential for an accident (radiological or other) during decommissioning is not inconsequential due to extensive activity that does not occur during normal operation of the active plant.
Capriciously, Entergy and Holtec ignore the very real risk presented by two high-pressure gas pipelines that run proximate to and actually traverse the Indian Point site: a 30-inch 750 per-square-inch-in-guage (psig) pipeline built in the 1960s and the 42-inch 850 psig Algonquin Incremental Market (AIM) pipeline owned by Enbridge which entered operation in January 2017. 4 The 37.6-mile pipeline transports more than 3 billion cubic feet of natural gas every day. The pipeline hazard is unique to Indian Point. 5
At Indian Point, the risks attendant to dismantlement and demolition, present at any reactor, are thus considerably heightened by the gas pipelines. Even a rupture, explosion and fire event that did not initiate a major radioactive release would patently cause chaos during decommissioning and lead to collapse and relocation of a wide variety of built and subterranean structures, as well as temporary structures and equipment set up to support decommissioning work. Holtec takes none of these realities into account in its cost estimate. Unfortunately the NRC has also failed to duly consider pipeline rupture events at the site.
On February 13, 2020, the NRC Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an Event Inquiry, “Concerns Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant.” 6 In its report, the OIG determined that the NRC employed a misguided use of a software program to evaluate the AIM pipeline risk and a misinformed understanding of how long it would take the Houston, Texas-located control room operators to close isolation valves to stop the flow of gas into a ruptured portion of the Indian Point area pipeline. The OIG noted that the NRC’s flawed safety analysis then supported the determination of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to approve modifications to the gas pipelines near Indian Point. An April 8, 2020 report of a NRC “Expert Evaluation Team” (NRC Evaluation Team Report) in reaction to the findings of the OIG, contends that there exists no immediate risk to Indian Point’s safety related structures, systems, or components (SSCs) This conclusion is dubious, but, in any event, it myopically focuses on the ability of the reactors to immediately shut down. A reactor meltdown is obviously not the relevant issue during decommissioning. Regardless of the impact on the more robust reactor structures before commencement of the process of dismantlement, a pipeline disaster would have a different impact altogether during active decommissioning when structures are in the process of being ripped apart, large and small pieces of equipment are being operated (including massive cranes, excavators and other vehicles, blowtorches, etc.), and – most critically – large numbers of workers are swarming all over the site.
The nearest remote-controlled valves to shut off the pipelines near Indian Point are 2.8 miles apart. These are controlled by Enbridge controllers over 1,000 miles away in Houston, Texas. The next closest downstream valves – also remote controlled from Texas – are roughly 5.6 miles downstream and 2.5 miles upstream. 8 The NRC Evaluation Team Report notes that “‘[b]last, overpressure, shrapnel, and earthquake-type effects’” from natural gas pipeline hazards can “‘adversely’” affect humans and property. 9 The vibrations of a rupture from the AIM pipeline could readily result in the rupture of the other active old pipeline. Notwithstanding, the potential pipeline blast radius from just the rupture of the giant AIM pipeline could be 1,690 feet. Yet the NRC Evaluation Team blithely concludes that “there is reasonable assurance that the safety-related equipment at Indian Point would enable the reactors to be shut down and remain safely shut down, providing for adequate protection of public health and safety.” 10
What about the “humans”? There is no conceivable way the numerous workers actively involved in multiple tasks and operations throughout the Indian Point site during decommissioning activity could evacuate in time to avoid the heat flux and potential fires.
Putting aside the human toll, it should be plain that a pipeline event would result in significant delays and increases in the cost of decommissioning – with lawsuits very likely resulting in Holtec or its contractors declaring insolvency and abandoning the project altogether.
4 New York State recognized the AIM pipeline risk in its “Algonquin Incremental Market Pipeline Risk Analysis Report,” transmitted from New York State agencies to FERC Chairman on June 22, 2018. While the full report has been deemed too sensitive to disclose to the public, its basic points were communicated. Rhodes, John B, CEO, Department of Public Service; Howard Zucker, MD, Commissioner, Department of Health; Roger Parrino, Commissioner, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services; and Basil Seggos, Commissioner , Department of Environmental Conservation, letter to Kevin J. McIntyre, Chairman, U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (cc to Howard Elliott, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Kristine Svinicki, Chair, Nuclear Regulatory Commission) re Safety Study of Algonquin Natural Gas Pipelines, Westchester County, New York, Jun 22, 2018. Link at: http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/
CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=17-00994.Algonquin Gas Pipeline Safety Study Issued – State Agencies Demand FERC Reduce Risks of Pipelines Near Indian Point; Call on FERC to Ban Additional Natural Gas Capacity on the Algonquin Pipelines, New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, Department of Public Service, Department of Environmental Conservation and Department of Health News Release, Jun 22, 2018. Link at: http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/MatterManagement/
CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=17-00994.Moreover, the risks were repeatedly raised by independent experts, citizens and public interest groups. See, e.g, Blanch, Paul, 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Regarding Violations of Regulations Indian Point Units 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286, Licence Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64, submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Sep 17, 2018. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1826/ML18261A296.pdf. Carbonare, Paola Dalle, Susan Van Dolsen, Ellen Weininger, Nancy S. Vann, Amy Rosmarin, Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition (IPSEC), Stop the Algonquin Pipeline Expansion (SAPE), and Safe Energy Rights Group, Inc. (SEnRG) et al letter to New York State, Sep 28, 2016. https://sape2016.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/2016-09-28-letter-to-cuomo_final1.pdf.
Three pipelines actually cross the below-ground portions of the Indian Point site, as a 26-inch 674 psig line built in the 1950s which is not in active service is being maintained to be returned to service if needed. The PSC acts as an agent for the federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). While PSC inspectors have observed a few tests of remote operation of the valves that would – if they operate properly – isolate the pipelines once Enbridge controllers in Texas became aware of a rupture, tests are just tests. Actual experience shows that situational awareness and adequate response under real-world conditions is another matter entirely.
5 Moreover, the possibility of an earthquake magnifies the exceptional pipeline hazard, as a temblor could initiate cracks or a major rupture of one or both active pipelines. A group of prominent seismologists from Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory determined that the pattern of subtle but active faults makes the risk of earthquakes to the Lower Hudson Valley region substantially greater than believed when Indian Point was built. Specifically, Indian Point sits astride the previously unidentified intersection of two active seismic zones. Sykes, 2008: Skykes LR, Armbruster JG, Kim W-Y, and Seeber L, Observations and Tectonic Setting of Historic and Instrumentally Located Earthquakes in the Greater New York City-Philadelphia Area, Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America (2008); 98 (4): 1696-1719. http://dx.doi.org/10.1785/0120070167. The NRC has never conducted a full evaluation of the potential impact of an earthquake during decommissioning activities, nor has the NRC evaluated the potential impact of an earthquake on the Indian Point ISFSI.
6 NRC Office of the Inspector General: Concerns Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Inspector General, Event Inquiry, Case No. 16-024, Feb 13, 2020. ML20056F095. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2005/ML20056F095.pdf.
7 NRC: Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Expert Evaluation Team on Concerns Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines Near the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, (ML20100F635), Apr 8, 2020. (NRC Evaluation Team Report) https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2010/ML20100F635.pdf.
8 The NRC Evaluation Team Report acknowledges that it can take minute to hours to isolate ruptured pipelines and that “in some cases the pressure drop from a pipeline rupture may make it challenging to close the nearest valve to a rupture, and operators may need to close a valve further from the rupture.” (NRC Evaluation Team Report, p 14)
9 NRC Evaluation Team Report, p 15, citing an Oak Ridge National Laboratory study performed for PHMSA . The NRC Evaluation Team Report also acknowledges that missiles from a pipe fragment may be thrown ~600 feet.
10 NRC Evaluation Team Report, p 17.
POINT TWO: None of the Documents or NRC Regulations Upon Which Entergy and Holtec Rely Contemplate the Level of Complexity and Uncertainty Added by the Pandemic to All Levels of Technical and Financial Risk
The impacts of any type of serious incident upon site decommissioning and spent fuel management can only be imagined in a world dealing with Covid-19. It will be quite some time before anyone can guess when the pandemic will end or whether incidence will hit a peak and then decline, or rise and fall with virulence, possibly over years or decades. It requires truly magical thinking to imagine that significant events would not severely challenge operational activity at the site during decommissioning, and by extension, the duration of such activity and the technical and financial capability of Holtec and its partners.
Moreover, the matter of events impacting operation and management of the site and decommissioning extends way beyond the potentially catastrophic to the mundane. Accidents, problems, delays due to vendors, etcetera, at any large complex site commonly occur, as even applicants acknowledge. Such events can only be reasonably anticipated to occur with some regularity under the schema and with the byzantine rather incomprehensible structure Holtec proposes in its “fleet” plan.
Holtec has never decommissioned a single nuclear power plant in the United States. It has, until very recently, focused on spent fuel canister and cask systems – and its activities in fuel transfer at San Onofre have been marred by delays, safety culture problems and confusion over what mandates NRC review. For example thin-walled canisters have been scratched and gouged when transferred from fuel pools to casks. In one case a canister got caught while being lowered into the storage cask and was dangerously suspended for hours. Holtec did not report this occurrence. It became known only when a whistleblower discussed the incident at a public hearing.
Nevertheless, Holtec now embarks upon a vast expansion of its nuclear operations, seeking to decommission multiple sites at the same time. Even with every optimistic assumption proffered by Holtec regarding its own estimated spectacular planned performance under the conditions existing at the time it submitted the Application and PSDAR to the NRC, how is this not a glaring fantasy in a Covid-19 threatened world?
Issues that will be evident in decommissioning were illuminated in a recent letter from the president of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the nuclear industry trade association, to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) with respect to refueling operations. The NEI notes that each plant typically brings in hundreds of specialized workers for such work over a typical period of 30-60 days, which includes activities in advance of and following the outage and that these workers typically stay in hotels or board with local families, and eat in restaurants. NEI requests DOE’s help to: “ ▪ Ensure that the Federal designation of essential workers includes workers supporting nuclear operations and refueling outages; ▪ Allow travel to the plants for the performance of these essential activities; ▪ Maintain hotel and food services to support these essential activities; ▪ Permit unfettered access to travel across state lines and in communities in order to reach plant sites, lodging, and food services; ▪ Provide priority for PPE, in particular, surgeons’ gloves, sanitized wipes, dust masks, and disposable thermometers; ▪ Provide priority for COVID-19 testing kits and necessary radiological and medical protective equipment and supplies for nuclear workers; and ▪ Permit international workers who perform highly specialized functions to travel into the U.S. and establish protocols immediately to enable their safe entry.” 11
The Covid-19 crisis has also led the NRC to relax standards and alter oversight in ways that should present a serious concern to New York authorities. In recent public meetings held via teleconference with stakeholders, NRC representatives stated that the NRC was not requiring nuclear site operators to report Covid-19 cases to the Commission. The NRC also stated that its oversight only extends to radiological health issues of workers, not the pandemic or other health issues. The NRC also stated that it was allowing deferral of maintenance and issuing exemptions to regulations relating to worker fatigue.
As summed up in recent Nuclear Intelligence Weekly reporting: “As the pandemic moves into an acute stage in many parts of the US, Energy Intelligence has identified a number of voids and inconsistencies in the response to the coronavirus by both regulators and operators that are potentially exacerbating its spread, endangering not only nuclear power plant workers but also the communities in which they live. These include the lack of any assessment so far as to whether in the midst of the pandemic reactor emergency plans would suffice to limit the spread of radiation after a severe accident. Beyond that, NRC guidance to plant operators is silent on certain required procedures that could be exacerbating the spread of Covid-19; nor is it making any effort to use its status as a federal regulator to coordinate health and safety or other measures -- such as delayed and staggered refuelings -- that could help thwart the contagion.” 12
11 Korsnick, Maria, President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute, letter to Dan Brouillette, Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy, Mar 20, 2020. https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/
letters-filings-comments/letter-nei-secretary-brouillette-20200320.pdf.
12 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly: United States: A Patchwork Response to Covid-19 Cases at Nuclear Plants, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, Apr 9, 2020. http://www.energyintel.com/pages/eig_article.aspx?DocId=1069207&NLID=104. See also, Smith, Grant, As Pandemic Rages, Federal Nuclear Regulators Put Keeping Reactors Running Ahead of Public Health and Safety, Environmental Working Group, Apr 27, 2020. https://www.ewg.org/energy/23141/pandemic-rages-federal-nuclear-regulators-put-keeping-reactors-running-ahead-public.
Other reports indicate nuclear sites are running low on protective supplies (gloves, wipes, masks and thermometers) and workers are fatigued and frightened. Hessler, Carl Jr, Workers ‘terrified’ at Limerick nuclear plant amid coronavirus, Montco Court News (MediaNews Group), Apr 5, 2020. https://www.pottsmerc.com/news/workers-terrified-at-limerick-nuclear-plant-amid-coronavirus/article_934efb34-76a4-11ea-afbe-17495d88f209.html. Roll Call: Citing virus, nuclear agency pulls back inspectors, Roll Call, Apr 2, 2020. https://www.rollcall.com/2020/04/02/citing-virus-nuclear-agency-pulls-back-inspectors.
The reality of the “human factor,” the physical vulnerability of executives, employees, contract workers and vendors means that nuclear industry actors and the NRC may no longer legitimately rely on the capability of human beings to function. Even if Holtec had vast experience in decommissioning, and long smooth-running collaborations in the process with contractors and vendors, the reality of our world now would blow that smoothly running machine to smithereens. This obviously is a problem that impacts the safety of operating reactors with immediacy. However it becomes something of massively elevated concern during fuel transfer and all other operations at nuclear sites which involve the orchestration of a multitude of corporate actors and literally swarms of workers involved in close collaboration, on-site and off. As Holtec acknowledges, on-site decommissioning work can involve thousands of individuals.
Not only will the issues of quarantine and potential transmission of infection from worker-to-worker on-site be a grave risk which can bring decommissioning to a screeching halt, but illness and incapacity of employees at every level of every single entity engaged – from the senior executives to administrative staffs to the highly skilled engineer to the temporary unskilled worker – will present staggering sets of problems.
POINT THREE: Conditions of the “New Normal” Render Holtec’s Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR), the Timeline, and the Site-Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimate (Cost Estimate) Obsolete
Petitioners contend there is enough money in the Decommissioning Trust Fund, including enough to manage spent fuel for decades. The NRC has granted exemptions allowing Holtec to use the Decommissioning Trust Fund – which was funded by New York ratepayers with the specific and sole purpose of supporting decommissioning – to pay for all expenses entailed in both decommissioning and nuclear waste management.
The United States has no permanent nuclear waste repository. As observed in a report issued after forums (comprised mostly of nuclear industry representatives) sponsored by Stanford University and George Washington University:
“The U.S. nuclear waste management program has labored for decades at a cost of billions of dollars each year, and yet there is still no active disposal program either for spent nucle¬ar fuel from commercial reactors or for the high-level radioactive legacy waste and spent nuclear fuel from defense programs. … The program has suffered from a number of factors, including major changes to the original law; a series of amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; a slowly developed but changing regulatory framework; erratic funding; significant changes in policy with changing administrations; conflicting Congressional and Executive policies; and finally, and most significantly, inadequate public engagement in deci¬sions about strategies for the storage and disposal of the nuclear waste. … Meanwhile, the U.S. program is an ever-tightening Gordian Knot — the strands of which are technical, scientific, logistical, regulatory, legal, financial, social and political — all subject to a web of agreements with states and communities, regulations, court rulings and the Con¬gressional budgetary process.” 13
Despite the many optimistic prognostications of federal agencies and the nuclear industry over the past half-century about a permanent or major off-site nuclear waste storage facility being feasible and viable ‘just over the horizon’, New York must proceed and plan under the more historically-informed and reasonable assumption that the state will be holding nuclear waste for the indefinite future, and very possibly well into the next century. In any event, Holtec’s divination that the waste will begin to be removed in the current decade is nothing more than a guess which is very likely guided by its financial self-interest in opening a massive “HI-STORE” Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF) in Southeastern New Mexico. That enterprise is hardly assured of being brought to fruition.
13 Reset of America’s Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policy, Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation and George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Oct 15, 2018. https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reset_report_2018_final.pdf.
14 ASLB: Official Transcript of Proceedings, in the Matter of Holtec International (HI-STORE Consolidated Interim Storage Facility), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Docket No. 72-1051-ISFSI, ASLBP No. 18-958-01-ISFSI-BD01, Jan 24, 2019, at p 282. http://wethefourth.org/files/pdf/ELEA-NRC-transcript-2019-01-24.pdf.
In fact, in proceedings before the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), Holtec representatives said that if a spent fuel canister being received at its proposed HI-STORE CISF were found to be defective or leaking upon receipt in New Mexico, Holtec would send it back to the nuclear power site from whence it came. 14
In this regard it must also be emphasized that numerous issues relating to management of the spent fuel, especially the high burnup fuel which is much more hot and radioactive than traditional lower burnup fuel, remain unresolved. A September 2019 report to Congress by the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB), an independent federal agency established by the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act, points out that periodic small-scale shipments of spent fuel have occurred for decades, but most of these involve transport of naval spent fuel conducted by the U.S. Navy. In contrast, transportation of large quantities of spent nuclear fuel (or SNF) and high level waste (HLW) has not been done in this country and will require significant planning and coordination by DOE. The NWTRB observes that unresolved technical issues could significantly delay or impede the implementation of a national transportation program for radioactive waste: “The large size, broad scope, and geographic distribution of the U.S. SNF and HLW program make resolving the technical and integration issues associated with a nationwide transportation effort a significant challenge. SNF and HLW inventories in the U.S. include a diverse collection of waste forms, waste storage containers, storage conditions, storage locations, waste transportation containers, and licensing requirements. Current waste storage sites also include several unique challenges, such as varying degrees of accessibility for large transport vehicles or railcars. Addressing the unresolved technical and integration issues associated with these program elements prior to initiating transportation will require a well-planned and well-integrated effort.” 15
Robert Alvarez, a senior scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies who previously served as a DOE Secretary Senior Policy Adviser, warns that high burnup fuel poses inadequately studied challenges to even temporary spent fuel storage plans. 16
Moreover, issues relating to the thin-wall canisters used and proposed by Holtec for use at Indian Point keep emerging. Of concern is a December 2019 report in which scientists at Sandia National Lab and Pacific Northwest National Lab changed the priority of stress corrosion cracking risks of thin-wall canisters to a high priority no “1” for research and identified a technology “gap” relating to assessment of impact of through-wall canister cracks. 17
In sum, the merits of the contention that decommissioning would flow smoothly and all the nuclear waste would be removed from the Indian Point ISFSI at the time Holtec envisions with nary a hitch were highly debatable prior to the Covid-19 crisis.
They are absurd now.
The logistical operations which applicants envision can no longer be viewed as reasonably feasible. Even if the pandemic abates far faster than predicted by medical experts and does not return, the workforce and economic disruption caused will have far ranging impacts on the capability and availability of the contractors and vendors and the many supply chains upon which Holtec must rely. 18
The pandemic has caused dramatic disruption of the entire society. Decommissioning and spent fuel management will not exist in a vacuum. The unstated presumption that any problem that emerges can be readily handled and no major delays will occur is now utterly unsupportable.
At best, given the current reality, Holtec’s cost estimates must now be viewed as exceedingly questionable and may not be properly accepted by the PSC.
POINT FOUR: The Public Interest is Not Served by Transfer of Indian Point to Holtec or Allowance of Any Reduction of Emergency Planning
Indian Point sits in the nation’s most populated region. The site is just 24 miles as the crow flies from New York City. Some 17 million live within 50 miles of the facility. No other nuclear site in the nation comes close to Indian Point in terms of surrounding population. The NRC has noted that most reactor sites in the US have population densities of under 200 persons per square mile. Indian Point has over 2,000 persons per square mile.
A release of radioactivity or other significant incident at the Indian Point site not only has the potential to harm people and the environment, it would surely destabilize the real estate market and economy of New York City and the entire Lower Hudson Valley for many decades to come.
The NRC has been granting exemptions to licensees of closed nuclear plants from certain emergency planning and preparedness requirements as well as issuing exemptions allowing reductions in the previously required level of primary offsite liability insurance.
Such exemptions pose unacceptable risk to New York, a state already bearing the extraordinary and punishing burden of Covid-19, which has most severely impacted public health providers, first responders and other state government workers.
The PSC must not allow any reduction in emergency planning or Indian Point licensee funding thereof.
CONCLUSION:
For all the reasons stated herein, CIECP and PHASE urge the PSC to reject the petition of Entergy and Holtec in this matter.
Quite literally, the financial viability of New York may depend upon the action the PSC takes in this matter.
15 Bahr JM, Becker SM, Brantley SL, Croff AG, Foufoula-Georgiou E, Illangasekare T, Peddicord KL, Turinsky PJ, and Zoback ML, Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation: Technical Issues that Need to Be Addressed in Preparing for a Nationwide Effort to Transport spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Energy, Sep 2019, at p xxiii. Link at: https://www.nwtrb.gov/our-work/press-releases/technical-issues-that-need-to-be-addressed-in-preparing-for-a-nationwide-effort-to-transport-spent-nuclear-fuel-and-high-level-radioactive-waste-is-subject-of-u.s.-nwtrb-report. The NWTRB also noted that “considerable planning and coordination will be required to refurbish or reestablish the capabilities to handle and load SNF con¬tainers, reconstitute needed site infrastructure (e.g., electrical power, radiolog¬ical controls), and rebuild the roadways and/or rail lines necessary to support SNF transportation.” (Id at p 31)
16 Alvarez, Robert, Spent Power Reactor Fuel: Pre-Disposal Issues, slide presentation at: Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants: What Congress, Federal Agencies and Communities Need to Know, Environmental and Energy Study Institute Decommissioning forum briefing, Jul 16, 2018. Link at: www.eesi.org/071618nuclear. (A graphic in this slide presentation depicts estimated quantity of thermally hotter high burnup (as well as low burnup) fuel generated by Indian Point as of 2013 (p 5). Alvarez notes that: “High burnup fuel reduces the fuel cladding thickness and a hydrogen-based rust forms on the zirconium metal used for the cladding, which can cause the cladding to become brittle and fail. High burnup fuel temperatures make the used fuel more vulnerable to damage from handling.” (p 7) Alvarez states that, even if the proposed centralized interim storage becomes available, the amount of spent fuel could clog transport and impact the schedule for relocation.) Billone MC, Burtseva TA, Han Z and Liu YY, Effects of Multiple Drying Cycles on High-Burnup PWR Cladding Alloys, Argonne National Laboratory Study for Department of Energy, FCRD-UFD-2014-000052 ANL-14/11, Sep 26, 2014. http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2014/09/107521.pdf
17 Teague MC, Saltzstein SJ, Hanson B, Sorenson KB, and Freeze GA, Gap Analysis to Guide DOE R&D in Supporting Extended Storage and Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel: An FY2019 Assessment, Sandia National Laboratories and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories report to U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, SANDA-2019-15479R; 681990, Dec 23, 2019. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1592862 Link at: https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1592862.
Sandia analysis has also found that: “Full loadings of high burnup fuels in very large casks may require decades of aging in pools” with minimum cooling time before storage or transport for burnup at 40 GWd/MTU and 45 GWd/MTU to be, respectively >20 years and ~25 years. Stockman C and Kalinina E, Cooling Times for Storage and Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Sandia National Laboratories brief presentation for U.S. Department of Energy, SAND2013-1698C, Feb 25, 2013, at pp 2 & 4. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1145261.
18 Supply chain issues extend way beyond protective gear. Donnan, Shawn, Christoph Rauwald, Joe Deaux and Ian King, A Covid-19 Supply Chain Shock Born in China Is Going Global, Bloomberg, Mar 20, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-20/a-covid-19-supply-chain-shock-born-in-china-is-going-global. FITCH SOLUTIONS: Rising Risks Of Disruptions To Global Food Supply Chains, Upside Risks To Agriculture Prices, Fitch Solutions, Mar 25, 2020. https://www.fitchsolutions.com/corporates/commodities/rising-risks-disruptions-global-food-supply-chains-upside-risks-agriculture-prices-25-03-2020.
As MarketWatch reports: “Consider it among the pitfalls of the just-in-time supply chain. The notion of avoiding the expensive stockpiling and housing of inventory has been a sound practice to streamline costs and operations. But when it comes to disruptions, like pandemics, natural disasters, or their subsequent fall-out — say, the Fukushima meltdown — its virtues tend to unravel rather quickly. . . . Throw in a top-down tendency toward secrecy, and fragmented communication with the outside world, and U.S. manufacturing relationships can become a nightmare when disaster strikes.” American firms may know who’s producing their electronic assemblies and circuit boards, but have little knowledge about ‘second-tier suppliers’ manufacturing their ingredients.” Gifford, Daron, U.S. factories are likely to close because of the coronavirus’ supply-chain shock, MarketWatch, Mar 26, 2020. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-factories-are-likely-to-close-because-of-the-coronavirus-supply-chain-shock-2020-03-16.) Linton, Tom and Bindiya Vakil, Coronavirus Is Proving We Need More Resilient Supply Chains, Harvard Business Review, Mar 5, 2020. https://hbr.org/2020/03/coronavirus-is-proving-that-we-need-more-resilient-supply-chains.
The disruption to global supply chains consequence by the coronavirus has also led to price increases cascading from factories to ports to customers. There is no reason to expect the nuclear industry and its contractors and vendors will be spared. Inventories of materials, components and tools now being relied upon will be depleted and this will inevitably cause delays and cost escalation at Indian Point, particularly for specialized parts. See, e.g., O’Leary, Lizzie, The Modern Supply Chain Is Snapping, The Atlantic, Mar 19, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/
supply-chains-and-coronavirus/608329/. Sherman, Erik, 94% of the Fortune 1000 are seeing coronavirus supply chain disruptions: Report, Fortune, Feb 21, 2020. https://fortune.com/2020/02/21/fortune-1000-coronavirus-china-supply-chain-impact/. Swanson, Ana, Global Trade Sputters, Leaving Too Much Here, Too Little There, New York Times, Apr 11, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/economy/
global-trade-shortages-coronavirus.html. (Idled factories and changes in demand have sown chaos and confusion in global shipping markets. As plane traffic plummets, airfreight has become prohibitively expensive. Mike Jette, vice president of consulting services at GEP, which provides supply chain software and strategy for major companies like Exxon Mobil, predicts that peak disruption for major companies with international supply chains would likely happen three months from now as companies exhaust their “safety stock” for components. The speed at which the crisis is unfurling makes it difficult for companies – which do not even know if they will be able to stay in business – to plan ahead.)
19 NRC: Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Final Report Public Comments (ML14196A107), Sep 2014. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1419/ML14196A107.pdf.